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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030638 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e), 
whereby a defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a 
final order of anything other than a first degree or capital felony. In this case, a 
"Judgment and Order of Probation" was entered on January 7, 2003, and a denial of 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial was entered July 28, 2003, by the Honorable Lyle 
Anderson, Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah (R. 213; 480). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues Presented For Appeal 
Issue #1: Did the trial court deny Penn his due process right to a fair trial and 
present erroneous instructions to the jury that: 1) misstated the law and improperly 
equated an inadequate record-keeping violation to felony possession of a controlled 
substance; 2) failed to clarify essential terms and allowed the jury to find guilt upon 
something other than a reasonable doubt; 3) impacted Penn's right to a preliminary 
hearing; and 4) misled the jury from the true elements of the charged offenses in Counts 
II and III, of which there was insufficient evidence to convict? 
Preservation: Issues regarding the propriety of the jury instructions were preserved 
for review in objections made during trial, (R. 507 at 147-148; 508 at 4-5); in Penn's 
motion for new trial (R. 235-236; 240-243; 261-262; 336; 351; 505 at 52-56); and were 
specifically denied by the district court (R. at 484-485). Further, even though a motion to 
dismiss is not necessary to preserve an insufficiency of the evidence claim, see State v. 
Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, f 21, a defense motion for directed verdict was made at the 
end of the State's case (R. 507 at 82-83). 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence at trial obtained from an 
"anticipatory search warrant" where: (1) the affidavit in support of the warrant did not 
establish probable cause; (2) the requisite "triggering events" necessary to the validity of 
the warrant did not occur; and (3) the information contained in the affidavit was void of 
any information about the CI, and was obtained illegally by the CI while acting as an 
agent of the police? 
Preservation: Issues regarding the anticipatory search warrant's triggering events 
and general probable cause were preserved in a pretrial motion to suppress, (R. 55- 66; 
504 at 23-26); in the motion for new trial (R. 243-250; 343-344; 505 at 36-42, 44-47); 
and was denied by the district court (R. 480-481). Issues regarding the lack of 
information in the search warrant affidavit concerning the CI and the failure of trial 
counsel to raise such issues were preserved in the motion for new trial (R. 249 n.8; 342-
343). Issues regarding the search of the CI illegally performed while an agent of the 
police were preserved during argument on the pretrial motion to suppress (R. 504 at 15-
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16, 18-23); during the trial (R. 506 at 99-102); in the motion for new trial (R. 344-345); 
and was denied by the district court (R. 480). 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in denying Penn's motion for new trial where the 
State failed to disclose material evidence in violation of due process, Utah discovery rules 
and Brady v. Maryland? 
Preservation: Issues involving the State's failure to disclose information was 
preserved in the motion for new trial (R. 348-351; 505 at 5-18, 47-51); and was denied by 
the district court (R. 482-484). 
Issue #4: Did the trial court err in admitting prejudicial testimony of prior bad acts 
at trial where the evidence was not admitted for a proper non-character purpose, where 
the evidence was irrelevant to the case, and where any possible probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial and misleading effect on the jury? 
Preservation: Issues regarding the irrelevant and prejudicial bad acts evidence 
were preserved in a pretrial motion in limine (R. 139-140); and were objected to during 
trial (R. 506 at 64-65). 
Issue #5: Did the trial court err in denying Penn's motion for new trial based on 
the admission of statements made by Penn in violation of Miranda v. Arizona? 
Preservation: Issues regarding Miranda violations and the failure of trial counsel to 
raise such issues were preserved in the motion for new trial (R. 347-348); and was denied 
by the district court (R. 482). 
Issue #6: Was trial counsel ineffective in: (1) failing to move to suppress evidence 
obtained from the anticipatory search warrant on the grounds that the triggering events 
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did not occur and that there was a complete absence of information about the CI in the 
affidavit in support of the warrant; (2) failing to move to suppress statements based on 
Miranda violations; and (3) failing to specifically question witnesses at trial regarding 
any deals made with the prosecution? 
Preservation: Issues concerning possible ineffective assistance of counsel was 
preserved in the motion for new trial (R.345-348); and was denied by the district court (R. 
482-484). 
Issue # 7: Does the cumulative effect of the numerous errors made in these 
proceedings undermine the confidence that a fair trial was had? 
Standards Of Review 
"[A] trial court's decision to use a jury instruction.. .alleged to have impacted the 
defendant's right to a fair trial.. .[is] reviewed for correctness." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 
2,1f 17 (citing State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993)). Thus, this Court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer to the trial judge's determination. See 
Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1999). 
This Court c"review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62, \ 8 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994)). 
"However,.. .the trial court's conclusions of law based on these findings [are reviewed] 
for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the 
legal standard to the facts." Id. See also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 31. Similarly, 
"any legal determinations made by the trial court as a basis for its denial of a new trial 
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motion are [also] reviewed for correctness." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ f 15 (citing 
State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, P ) . 
When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of evidence, this Court reviews the 
facts in a light favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 12. 
However, u[a]n appellate court should overturn a conviction for insufficient evidence 
when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of 
the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant committed the crime." Id. (citing cases). 
In reviewing whether an affidavit provided probable cause to issue a search 
warrant, an appellate court is bound by the contents of the affidavit, and therefore does 
not defer to the trial court's finding, but rather "make[s] an independent review of the 
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence." State v. Saddler, 
2003 UT App 82, f 7 (internal quotations omitted). 
This Court analyzes a trial court's decision to exclude or admit "bad acts" evidence 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Salt Lake City v. Alires, 9 P.3d 769,772 (Utah 
App. 2000). In doing so, this Court "review[s] the record to determine whether the ... bad 
acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise of that 
discretion."' State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 6 P.3d 1120, 1124-25 (Utah 2000) (quoting State 
v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah), cert denied, 120 S.Ct 1181 (2000)). 
"[Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of fact and 
law." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). The trial court's factual findings 
will be set aside when they are clearly erroneous. See id. 
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Finally, under the Cumulative Error Doctrine, this Court will reverse when "the 
cumulative effect of.. .several errors undermines [the] confidence.. .that a fair trial was 
had." State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7, 15 (Utah 2000) (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1229 (Utah 1993)). 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, constitutional provisions and rules are relevant to this 
appeal and the issues presented:1 
Statutes: 
UTAH CODE. ANN. § 58-37-6(2)(b); 
UTAH CODE. ANN. § 58-37-8; 
UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-1-501; 
UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-2-303(6). 
Constitutional Provisions: 
U.S. Const, amends. IV, V, VI, XIV; 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 13 and 14. 
Rules: 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4, 16; 
Utah Rules of Evidence 402,403,404. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29, 2002, Dr. Nathaniel Penn ("Penn") was charged by Information with 
three second degree felony counts of Unlawful Possession of A Controlled Substance in 
A Drug-Free Zone, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). See R. 1-2;142-
144. Count I charged illegal possession of psilocin; Count II charged illegal possession 
of hydrocodone; and Count III charged illegal possession of demerol. See id. 
'The referenced provisions are attached as "Addendum A." 
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Prior to trial, on July 16, 2002, Mr. Greg Skordas filed a motion for discovery 
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. See R. 23-25. Counsel representing Penn 
prior to Mr. Skordas also made a similar request. See R. 9-10. Further, Mr. Skordas also 
filed several pretrial motions. Relevant to this appeal, trial counsel filed a motion to 
suppress evidence gathered pursuant to the anticipatory warrant authorized in this case, 
see R. 55-66; a motion in limine to exclude testimony of irrelevant prior bad acts 
including the prescribing practices at Penn's clinic, see R. 139-140; and a motion seeking 
to exclude post-Miranda statements, see R. 130-131. The district court either did not 
consider or denied all of the motions. 
On November 22, 2002, Penn was convicted by a jury of all three counts of 
possession of a controlled substance. See R. 202. On January 7, 2003, the district court 
sentenced Penn to serve concurrent terms in the Utah State Prison of 1-15 years on the 
first two counts, not more than five years on the third count, and pay a fine and 
assessment in a total amount of $1,850. The district court stayed the prison term and 
placed Penn on probation with specified conditions, including serving 180 days in the 
county jail. See R. 503 at 15; 209-212; 213-216. Penn has served his jail time and is not 
presently incarcerated. 
On January 21, 2003, Penn timely filed a Motion for New Trial, a Motion to Stay 
the Sentence, and an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. See R. 217-279. The 
Motion to Stay the Sentence and Application for Certificate of Probable Cause were 
denied by the district court on February 19, 2003. See R. 293-294. Penn thereafter 
appealed the denial of the certificate of probable cause to this Court, which was 
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summarily denied. See R. 296-298; R. 305-306. 
With new counsel, Penn filed a Motion for New Trial and set forth numerous 
issues relating to: 1) erroneous instructions presented to the jury, see R. 235-236; 240-
243; 261-262; 336, 351; 2) the authorization, execution and validity of the anticipatory 
search warrant as well as possible ineffective assistance claims for failure to raise specific 
issues, see R. 243-250; 261-262; 336; 342- 347; 351-352; 3) possible ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to seek the suppression of statements obtained in violation 
of Miranda v. Arizona, see R. 342; 347-348; 352; and 4) the State's failure to disclose 
material information that prejudiced the defense, see R. 348-352. 
On July 8, 2003, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for 
New Trial. See generally R. 475-476; 505. All grounds were rejected and the motion was 
denied on July 28, 2003. See R. 480-486.2 A Notice of Appeal was timely filed and 
entered on August 4, 2003. See R. 487. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Relevant Evidence Presented At Trial 
Dr. Penn ran a small medical clinic in Moab, Utah. See R. 506 at 60-61. The 
clinic's atmosphere was friendly and cordial, like a small family. See R. 507 at 23. The 
patients were diverse and included many who fell through the cracks and could not 
otherwise afford treatment. See R. 507 at 30-31, 118. The clinic also treated many urgent 
care patients. See R. 507 at 32. 
2A copy of the "Ruling On Motion For New Trial" is attached as "Addendum C." 
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Penn's small staff included Ms. Lisa LaPlante ("LaPlante") who, during the 
relevant time period, had worked at the clinic doing transcription and office management 
for approximately six months. See R. 506 at 60-61, 85; 507 at 45-46. In January of 2002, 
LaPlante became a victim of domestic violence when her husband, Gene LaPlante held an 
automatic assault rifle to her head and threatened to kill her as well as himself. See R. 
507 at 120; 505 at 20; 502, Exhibit 2 (police report involving incident). The next 
morning, after LaPlante went to the clinic bruised and visibly upset, see R. 507 at 47-48, 
120, 133; Penn reported the incident to the police, see R. 506 at 93; 507 at 48. Gene 
LaPlante was thereafter arrested and charged with aggravated assault. See R. 506 at 66-
67, 104. 
In March of 2002, Penn's clinic closed down for financial reasons unrelated to the 
investigation. See R. 506 at 78; 507 at 21, 66, 117. While Penn was out of state, LaPlante 
helped move the contents of the clinic to the residence Penn shared with Ms. Cindy Drew 
and her children. See 507 at 21-22, 39, 65-66; 508 at 39. When Penn returned, most 
everything in the clinic, including the medications, had been moved to the residence. See 
R.506 at 78-80; 507 at 21-22, 38-40. Some of the medications required refrigeration and, 
as such, Drew placed a ziplock baggie of medication and other "odds and ends" in the 
back of the refrigerator. See R. 507 at 41-42, 68. 
Unbeknownst to Penn, Drew, or anyone at the clinic, LaPlante was an agent of the 
police and her services were used continuously between January and April of 2002. See 
R. 506 at 88.While serving as a confidential informant in April of 2002, LaPlante went 
into the Penn/Drew residence while Penn and Drew were out of town and conducted a 
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search. See R. 506 at 77-78, 169-170. Thereafter, LaPlante reported to the DEA that 
controlled substances were present in the residence. See R. 506 at 169-170. Also during 
this time period, the DEA wired LaPlante on two occasions and sent her into Penn's 
residence to develop evidence supporting the allegation that Penn was wrongfully 
prescribing controlled substances. See R. 506 at 106, 110-111, 144-146; 508 at 36-37. 
Those efforts failed as Penn refused requests to write illegal prescriptions. See R. 506 at 
124-128, 175. Penn eventually agreed, however, that he may be willing to purchase 
mushrooms from her brother. See R. 506 at 75,130-131,147-148; 507 at 61. 
Thereafter, on April 19, 2002, DEA agents obtained an anticipatory search 
warrant. See R. 506 at 152, 154, 169, 194. The next day, LaPlante and Agent Mark 
Bacon, posing in an undercover capacity as LaPlante's brother, went to Penn's home 
hoping he would accept psilocybic mushrooms. See R. 506 at 133, 155-156, 189-193, 
195. In the process, agent Bacon again attempted to get Penn to illegally distribute and 
offered to trade mushrooms for the prescription drug Lortab. See R. 506 at 83, 156, 174, 
196. Penn refused. See R. 506 at 83, 156, 174-175, 196. However, Penn did agree to take 
possession of the mushrooms. See R. 506 at 83-84, 156, 193. After Penn accepted the 
mushrooms, a waiting team of agents executed the search warrant. See R. 506 at 157. 
Facts Relating To Information Undisclosed By The State 
Evidence presented during the trial only showed a partial picture and material 
information was not disclosed to the defense or the jury. 
On January 9, 2002, Gene LaPlante pointed an AK-47 at his wife's head. See R. 
507 at 120; 505 at 20; 502, Exhibit 2 (police report involving incident); 502, Exhibit 5 at 
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14-17; 502, Exhibit 4 at 191-193. Based upon the report of Penn, Gene LaPlante was 
arrested. Very shortly thereafter he bailed out and immediately reconciled with his wife. 
See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 26-28. The day after Gene LaPlante bailed out of jail on the 
felony charge, LaPlante initiated a conversation with her neighbor, Officer Eddie 
Guerrero of the Moab City Police Department. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 29-31. During the 
conversation, LaPlante and the officer discussed the possibility of trading information 
LaPlante claimed to have involving Penn illegally prescribing controlled substances in 
exchange for a favorable disposition of Gene LaPlante's felony offense. See R. 502, 
Exhibit 5 at 32-33; 505 at 21-22. 
A meeting was then arranged with Bill Benge, the Grand County Attorney. During 
that meeting LaPlante agreed to become a confidential informant. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 
34-36; 502, Exhibit 4 at 197. The specific arrangement made was that the pending felony 
charge against Gene LaPlante would "go away" if LaPlante agreed to help in the State's 
investigation of Penn. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 36-37; 502, Exhibit 4 at 193-197. LaPlante 
agreed to cooperate. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 33-37. LaPlante also received financial 
compensation for her cooperation. See R. 502, Exhibit 4 at 199-200; 506 at 109. 
Although the existence of the underlying charge as well as the court disposition of 
the case was known to Mr. Skordas, the promise or deal made between LaPlante and the 
County Attorney was never revealed. See R. 403-404. The State also never disclosed the 
payments of money, or that in this precise time frame, Gene LaPlante was also being 
investigated for additional criminal conduct involving slashing tires at a local bar, 
Woody's Tavern, and stalking a woman. See R. 505 at 19-20; R. 502, Exhibit 1 (police 
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report involving tire slashing incident); 502, Exhibit 3 (police report involving stalking 
incident). These charges were never filed. See R. 505 at 12-13, 22-23. 
Finally investigative reports were prepared after interviews with material witnesses 
which were never provided to the defense. See R. 403-404; 456-473; 502, Exhibit 6 at 31, 
39-40, 45-47; 505 at 47-50. 
Facts Relating To Erroneous Jury Instructions 
Prior to rendering their verdict, the jury was provided instructions from the court.3 
See generally, R. 181-201; 508 at 9-20. Included within those instructions were the 
following: 
Instruction No. 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as 
follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF PSILOCIN IN A DRUG 
FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant possessed psilocin, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Knowing what it was and intending to possess 
it. 
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HYDROCODONE IN 
A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying 
with the law. (emphasis added) 
3A copy of the "Court's Instructions to the Jury" is Attached as "Addendum D." 
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COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN 
A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed demerol, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying 
with the law. (emphasis added) 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the 
state has failed to prove any one of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
R. 184-185; 508 at 11-12. 
Instruction No. 6 states the following: 
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must still 
obtain a prescription for any controlled substance for personal use. 
Physicians licensed to dispense or administer controlled substances 
are also permitted to possess reasonable quantities of controlled 
substances for dispensing or administering to patients, but they are 
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for 
that purpose and dispensed or administered by them as physi-
cians. A physician who fails to comply with this requirement 
possesses those substances illegally. 
R. 188 (emphasis added); 508 at 13:10-20. 
Before giving the instructions, the parties and the court discussed how to instruct 
the jury concerning a physician's possession of controlled substances. See R. 507 at 147-
148. Among other objections to the instructions, Mr. Skordas objected to Instruction No. 
6. See R. 188; 508 at 4. Mr. Skordas asked that the last sentence of the instruction, which 
charged that a physician who fails to comply with record-keeping requirements possesses 
substances illegally, be stricken. See R. 508 at 4:3-17. The district court ultimately 
overruled the defense objections and read the instruction as written. See R. 508 at 4:18-
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25,5:1-8, 13:10-20. 
Confusion with the issues in the case became evident as the jury submitted 
questions regarding a physician's record-keeping, prescription writing, and dispensing 
practices. See R. 507 at 4, 81-82. Further, based upon the instructions, the State 
specifically argued to the jury that improper record-keeping amounted to the offense of 
illegal possession. See R. 508 at 25-27, 48. Mr. Skordas tried to redirect the jury's 
attention to the true issues of the case, arguing that the elements of constructive 
possession had not been met. See R. 508 at 38-42. 
Subsequently, in a motion for new trial, Penn asserted that the jury instructions 
were plainly erroneous and prejudicially misstated the law. See R. 235-236; 240-243; 
261-262; 336; 351. The district court rejected these contentions. See R. 484-485. 
Facts Relating To The Anticipatory Search Warrant 
The State presented evidence at trial relative to all three counts which had been 
gathered during the search of Penn's residence on April 20, 2002. The search was 
conducted pursuant to an "anticipatory search warrant" authorized by the Honorable 
Judge Manley on April 19, 2002. See R. 62-66.4 
The "Anticipatory Warrant" Is Acquired 
On April 19, 2002, Investigator Rob Johnson ("Johnson") from the DEA sought 
and obtained an anticipatory search warrant to search the Penn residence. See R. 66. 
Section 6 of the affidavit in support of the warrant is titled "Anticipatory Information" 
4A copy of the Warrant and supporting affidavit are attached as "Addendum B." 
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and states: 
On April 20, 2002, between 1000 and noon, DEA agents will 
meet with CI. CI and an undercover agent (UC) will be searched 
and CI will be wired. CI or UC will be given some psilocybin 
mushroom. CI's vehicle will also be searched. CI and an 
undercover agent will drive in CI's vehicle to the above 
described residence of Penn and Drew with the mushrooms. 
Agents will have CI and UC under visual and audio observation 
at all times driving to and from said residence. They will have 
CI and UC under audio observation while they are in the 
residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer Penn 
and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or 
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave 
the residence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-
searched. 
R. 66 (emphasis and underline added). 
Based on this affidavit, an anticipatory warrant was authorized which stated that 
"this search warrant is valid only upon the occurrence of the events described in the 
affidavit for this anticipatory search warrant." R. 63. 
The Affidavit Relies On Improper Information 
Officers relied, in part, on information received from LaPlante in support of the 
warrant. See R. 65. Some of this information was obtained during an illegal search of the 
Drew/Penn residence while LaPlante was an agent of the police. 
More specifically, after meeting with the County Attorney and agreeing to become 
a confidential informant, see R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 34-36; 502, Exhibit 4 at 197; and after 
signing an official DEA agreement to become an informant, see R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 53; 
506 at 69-70, 142-143; LaPlante went into the Penn residence and searched the home, 
including the refrigerator and bathroom cabinets, "looking to see if there were drugs in 
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there to report to the DEA." R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 56-57; 506 at 55-56, 77-78, 134. The 
very day LaPlante made her observations, she told DEA agents. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 
60. This report was used in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. See R. 502, 
Exhibit 6 at 60-62; 66; 506 at 169-170. 
The Stated "Triggering Events " 
Were Facially Defective And Never Occurred 
DEA agents executed the warrant on April 20, 2002. Prior to or during trial, trial 
counsel never challenged the anticipatory warrant on the basis that the triggering events 
did not occur. Post-trial, however, Investigator Johnson testified under oath regarding the 
circumstances concerning the execution of the warrant and arrest of Penn. See generally 
R. 502, Exhibit 6. Johnson explained that on April 20th, LaPlante and Agent Mark 
Bacon, in an undercover capacity, entered the Penn residence in anticipation of a 
controlled sale. See id. at 13-14, 17. See also R. 506 at 155-156. As soon as LaPlante and 
Bacon left the residence and were away from the door, an entry team "immediately" 
entered and secured the home, including handcuffing Penn. See R. 502, Exhibit 6 at 17-
20. See also R. 506 at 157, 197. Johnson is aware of noone searching LaPlante or Bacon 
prior to the officers' entry into the home to execute the warrant. See R. 502, Exhibit 6 at 
20-22. Nor is Johnson aware of anyone searching LaPlante's vehicle prior to entry into 
Penn's residence to execute the warrant. See id. ?L\2\-22. 
Similarly, LaPlante verified that as part of a controlled sale, she went into Penn's 
residence with Agent Bacon. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 72-73; 506 at 81-82. Within 
seconds of leaving the house, agents immediately "flew in from everywhere."R. 502, 
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Exhibit 5 at 73, 75; 506 at 84:13-20. LaPlante was not searched before the warrant was 
executed and prior to officers entering Penn's residence. See R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 74. In 
fact, LaPlante confirms that she was not researched until after the agents entered Penn's 
house to execute the warrant. See id. LaPlante further confirms that her vehicle was not 
searched between the time she left Penn's residence and the time agents entered the 
home. See id. at 75. 
Facts Relating To Miranda Violations 
With regard to the questioning of Penn during the execution of the search warrant, 
Investigator Johnson explained that by the time he entered the residence, Penn had 
already been handcuffed and had been placed at the kitchen table. See R. 502, Exhibit 6 at 
20, 81, 85. Agents told Penn they knew he had just purchased mushrooms, that they had a 
search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where the mushrooms were 
located. See id. at 82. In response, Penn admitted that the mushrooms were in a kitchen 
drawer. See id. Officers then mirandized Penn and asked if he wanted to give a 
statement. See id.. Penn asked for an attorney at that time. See id. However, Penn 
seemingly made additional comments in response to statements of officers. See R. 506 at 
176-183. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Several errors and improprieties occurred during the prosecution and trial of this 
matter that had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Mr. Penn. These errors fall 
within three general categories: 1) errors regarding the jury instructions given by the court 
at trial and the ramifications of such errors; 2) errors regarding the validity of the 
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anticipatory warrant and its execution; and 3) the failure of the prosecution to disclose 
material information to the defense. Most of these issues were properly raised, objected 
to, and ruled upon prior to or during the trial of this case. Some were not, and therefore, 
inasmuch as prior trial counsel failed to properly object or raise any of the specific issues 
noted herein, such amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel which also forms the 
basis for the granting of relief. 
Standing alone, each error, illegality, or impropriety, warrants relief. Importantly, 
however, the combination of all such errors evidence that Penn's right to a fair trial was 
violated and must be duly remedied by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS 
AND DENIED PENN HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
As noted above, Penn was found guilty of three counts of "unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. As a primary ground 
for Penn's motion for new trial, Penn asserted that the instructions to the jury were 
erroneous and misstated the law, effectively creating a new crime that violated due 
process. See R. 235-236; 240-243; 261-262; 336; 351. Although noting that "this case 
presented an interesting question," the district court denied Penn's motion finding that it 
sought input from trial counsel in how to instruct the jury on the charges of illegal 
possession, but that trial counsel "acceded" to the language proposed by the court. See R. 
484. But see R. 508 at 4 (trial counsel objecting to instruction). The district court also 
reasoned that Utah appellate courts have given no guidance on how to instruct a jury in a 
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case like this, and consequently, the instruction was not "objectively unreasonable." R. 
485. Finally, the district court concluded that "Penn cannot now be permitted to second 
guess that decision and obtain a new trial with a different instruction, followed, if 
necessary, by a third trial with yet a third version of the instructions." R. 485. For the 
following reasons, this Court should reject the district court's analysis and find that the 
instructions given in this case were erroneous and prejudicial to a fair trial. 
The specific provision under which Penn was charged states that it is unlawful: 
For any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance... unless it was obtained under 
a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while 
acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter... 
Utah Code. Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
A physician is clearly authorized by Chapter 37 to possess Schedule II controlled 
substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(2)(b). Importantly, Counts II and III deal with 
Schedule II controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b) The instructions 
in this case, however, ignored that critical fact and absolutely misstate the law. Such 
violated Penn's due process rights to a fair trial and the conviction cannot stand. 
Overall, the instructions to the jury in this case wreaked havoc on the fairness of 
this trial and failed in the following particulars: 1) the instructions misstate the elements 
of "unlawful possession" of a controlled substance as contemplated by § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); 
2) The instructions give no guidance as to the required elements of the newly created 
felony "record-keeping offense;" 3) there is no definition of the mental state required for 
the new offense, and 4) the instructions effectively allowed the jury to find guilt upon 
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something other than reasonable doubt. Relatedly, the impact of the erroneous 
instructions impacted Penn further. The newly created crime prejudiced Penn since he 
had not been afforded a preliminary hearing in regard to the new offense and therefore, 
had improper notice as to what he stood trial for. Finally, the newly created crime misled 
the jury from the true elements of the possession charges, of which there was insufficient 
evidence to support convictions. 
A. The Instructions Improperly Equate Inadequate Record 
Keeping To Felony Possession of A Controlled Substance. 
Specifically, Instruction No. 3, states that an individual is guilty of the specific 
crime of "unlawful possession" when a person possesses a controlled substance "without 
a prescription or otherwise complying with the law." The instruction goes on to state that 
such elements must be found "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, there was no 
instruction clarifying what "otherwise complying with the law means." Without 
definition, such a phrase could be used by a jury to find guilt of "unlawful possession" 
based upon a violation of any provision of law, no matter how minor. The instruction, 
therefore, misinstructs the jury since a violation of Chapter 37 is not necessarily the 
felonious crime of "unlawful possession." 
Moreover, the closest clarification as to what "otherwise complying with the law" 
means was found in Instruction No. 6. Therein, the jury was told that physicians are 
required to keep a record of controlled substances received for the purpose of administer-
ing as a physician, and that a "physician who fails to comply with this requirement 
possesses those substances illegally" (emphasis added). Here, the failure to keep 
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adequate records is both automatically and erroneously equated to the felony offense of 
"unlawful possession,"and the court's instruction effectively creates a new crime. The 
importance of this is evident since the jury submitted a number of questions during the 
trial concerning whether failure to keep proper records or obtain prescriptions in 
employees' names was illegal and amounted to improper possession.5 It is also evident 
that the State jumped onto this new crime bandwagon6 and argued forcefully that Penn's 
purported practice of writing prescriptions in employees names "rather than going 
through the paperwork and record-keeping" required made him guilty of unlawful 
possession. See R. 508 at 25-27. The State concluded by inappropriately stating that 
Specifically, the following questions were asked: 
• Is it illegal for a doctor to write prescriptions in his employee's names to fill 
his office needs? 
• Don't companies give free samples? 
• What are his office needs? 
Are we trying to find out if he's guilty of personally using drugs, not that he 
was dispensing prescriptions to give drugs, oxycontin to patients? 
• Is it legal and customary to have patients return unused medication to a 
clinic? 
R. 507 at 81-82. 
6Despite objections in a motion in limine filed by the defense, see R. 139-140, 
much of the state's case-in-chief centered around testimony concerning record-keeping 
and prescription practices of the clinic. See R. 506 at 62, 97; R. 507 at 17-21, 25-27, 33-
44,62-64,78-79.99-109, 111-114, 123-125. 111-114. With specific regard to records, a 
log book was kept at the clinic recording when a patient received a narcotic medicine. See 
R. 507 at 78, 112. A chart was also kept "as best they could" when samples were given 
out. &eR, 507 at 112-114. 
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"You've seen absolutely nothing here in court today of any records kept by Dr. Penn."7 R. 
508 at 27:22-24. 
Importantly, the equating of improper record-keeping to the crime of "unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance" is simply wrong. While the failure to keep adequate 
records may be improper, unethical, and could amount to possible civil and administra-
tive liability, a failure to "knowingly" keep proper records alone is, at most, a class B 
misdemeanor under criminal law. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (providing that any 
violation of Chapter 37 for which no penalty has been delineated, is a Class B 
misdemeanor). However, the instructions improperly convert a possible misdemeanor 
violation into a second degree felony. Such is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislature, and to uphold the trial court's instruction would mean that any time a 
clerical error is made or any record-keeping violation occurs, a doctor is guilty of felony 
possession. Simply put, a doctor does not become a felon merely because he does not 
keep proper records. 
B. The Instructions Give No Guidance To Clarify 
The Scope Of The Newly Created Offense, 
Although the creation of the new crime was improper, the error is amplified as the 
jury was given absolutely no direction concerning the newly created felony offense. 
First, the jury was given absolutely no guidance as to what the record-keeping 
7Indeed, it was not Penn's burden to show that he kept records, it was the State's 
burden to prove that he did not. Testimony was certainly elicited that logs were kept. The 
State, therefore, had the burden to show the records were inadequate or did not otherwise 
comply with law. Moreover, even if the State could prove that Penn's clinic records were 
inadequate, such does not amount to the felony possession of a controlled substance. 
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requirements are. Although the jury was clearly told by both the court and the State that a 
physician who does not properly keep records possesses drugs illegally, the jury was 
given absolutely no direction as to what records were required, how they should have 
been kept, and under what circumstances the law was violated. 
The jury was also never instructed as to the mental state required relative to the 
new record-keeping violation. The jury was not guided as to whether Penn had to be the 
one who failed in the record-keeping duties, or whether he was also criminally 
responsible for a dereliction in record-keeping on the part of his staff. 
Finally, the jury was never told that the failure to keep the appropriate records, 
which had effectively become an offense, had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Indeed, Instruction No. 6 clearly stated that a physician who fails to comply with record-
keeping requirements "possesses those substances illegally," misleading the jury to 
believe a finding of guilt was automatic. Thus, the instructions improperly relieved the 
prosecution of it burden to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt 
in violation of due process. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. 
Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1). Accordingly, 
the convictions cannot stand. 
C. Penn Was Afforded No Preliminary Hearing 
On The Newly Created Felony Offense. 
Another ramification of creating the new felony offense at trial is that Penn's due 
process rights were violated since a preliminary hearing was not held on the charge. See 
UT. CONST, art. I, § 13. The right to a preliminary hearing is substantial. See e.g., State v. 
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Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Utah 1988); State v. Leek, 39 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 
1934); State v. Pay, 146 P. 300, 304 (Utah 1915). Its purpose is to: 
secure to the accused, before he is brought to trial under 
an information, the right to be advised of the nature of the 
accusation against him and to be confronted with and given 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses testifying on 
behalf of the state. [The defendant] is thus enabled, if he so 
desired, to fully inform himself of the facts upon which the 
state relies to sustain the charge made against him, and be 
prepared to meet them at trial. 
State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085, 1086 (Utah 1908). 
Thus, a preliminary hearing is a prerequisite to prosecution by information, see 
e.g., State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (Utah 1943); State v. Leek, 39 P.2d 1091, 
1092 (Utah 1934); State v. Hale, 263 P. 86, 89 (Utah 1927); and a defendant may not be 
lawfully tried and convicted on a charge upon which a defendant is not given a 
preliminary hearing. See e.g., Jensen, 103 P.2d at 951-52. 
As noted, fundamental to due process is the notion of advance notice. Changing 
the elements of the crime after the evidence has already been presented at trial, however, 
does not meet any standard of appropriate notice. Cf. State v. Bush, 2000 UT App 10, ^  ^  
24-29 (agreeing that new preliminary hearing was necessary where state amended charges 
and defendant not given opportunity to explore state's new theory to be used at trial). 
In this case, the court and the prosecution essentially changed the substantive 
offense after the evidence was closed. In essence, the first time Penn was given actual 
notice that a failure to keep appropriate records was tantamount to unlawful felony 
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possession was after both sides had rested and the instructions were read. Penn never 
received a preliminary hearing on the new charge and such procedure was entirely 
improper.9 
D. The Instructions Misled The Jury From The True 
Elements Of A Possession Charge, Of Which There 
Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Convictions. 
The instructions also misdirected the jury from focusing on the true elements of a 
drug possession charge and the evidence presented during the trial was insufficient as a 
matter of law to support the jury verdict for Counts II and III. 
The burden on the State in this case was two-fold. First, the State had to prove that 
the substances found were illegally possessed by a physician, a person who by law held 
special authority to possess such substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(2)(b). 
Secondly, this case was clearly one of constructive possession since the Demoral 
and Hydrocodone were found in a jointly occupied residence and were handled by any 
number of people during the move of the clinic. To establish "constructive possession," 
the State must establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the drugs to prove 
8Trial counsel defended Counts II and III based upon the lack of constructive 
possession. Even with a correct instruction, there was insufficient evidence presented to 
justify a conviction as to Counts II and III. See Point D below. 
9Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d) states, in relevant part, 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to 
be amended at anytime before verdict if no additional or 
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of 
the defendant are not prejudiced. 
Utah R. Cr. Pr. 4(d) (emphasis added). 
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that the defendant had both the power and the intent to exercise control over the object. 
See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 13. The mere ownership and/or occupancy of a 
portion of the premises where drugs are found cannot, alone, support a finding of 
knowing and intentional possession by an accused, especially when occupancy is not 
exclusive. See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). Thus, in order to meet the burden, the State must show that: 
1) the accused had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and its narcotic 
character; 2) the controlled substance was subject to the defendant's dominion and 
control; and 3) the accused held the intent to exercise control and intended to use the 
controlled substance as his own. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 13 ("There must be facts 
which show the accused intend to use the drugs...as his own"); Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388; 
Fox, 709P.2dat319. 
Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, there was not 
sufficient competent evidence presented to the jury to sustain either of the convictions for 
Counts II an III, possession of demoral and hydrocodone. Indeed, evidence established 
that Penn was a physician operating a clinic. That clinic closed, and in the process of 
closing, the contents of the clinic were packed up, separated, and moved by employees 
and the confidential informant to the residence where Drew, her children, and Penn 
resided. Evidence showed that Drew placed a number of medicines, including the 
demerol, in a ziplock baggie and put the bag in the back of the refrigerator until they 
could be properly dispensed. Evidence also showed that a bottle of hydrocodone was 
found in the medicine cabinet that was filled with all kinds of odds and ends from the 
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clinic. While Penn had access to the refrigerator and the medicine cabinet, no evidence 
showed that Penn knew the specific items were present. Nor did the evidence show that 
Penn illegally intended to exercise dominion and control over such medications. 
Importantly, because Penn was a physician and the demerol and hydrocodone obviously 
had been used for medical purposes and were being stored at the residence on an interim 
basis, there was no evidence or proper explanation to the jury why Penn's possession as a 
physician was illegal. Simply, the State's evidence concerning the true elements of the 
offense of illegal possession was insufficient and the convictions must be reversed. 
II. EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE ANTICIPATORY 
WARRANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
The trial court also erred in denying Penn's motion to suppress and subsequent 
motion for new trial based upon an invalid "anticipatory search warrant." In general, 
anticipatory search warrants are nbased upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at 
some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a 
specified place." State v. Womack, 967 P.2d 536, 539 (Utah App.1998) (citation omitted). 
Two general requirements must be met for an anticipatory warrant to be valid: (1) it must 
be supported by probable cause; and (2) the warrant or supporting affidavit must clearly 
set out conditions precedent to the warrant's execution. See id. at 543 (citing United States 
v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
With these general standards in mind, the anticipatory warrant was improperly 
authorized and executed in the following ways: (1) the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause; (2) the "triggering events" necessary to the validity of the warrant did not 
27 
occur; and (3) information in the warrant was improperly obtained and was materially 
deficient with regard to the reliability, basis of knowledge, and veracity of the CI. 
A. The Warrant Was Not Supported By Probable Cause 
With regard to the general probable cause of the warrant in this case, the district 
court attempted to read the mind of the magistrate and rewrite the affidavit and warrant 
itself. The trial court stated: 
Even though the affidavit failed to recite that the officers expected 
Penn to accept the offer of drugs, . . . the magistrate clearly 
intended that acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for 
execution of the warrant, and the conduct of the officers shows 
that they understood this as well. 
R.481, Tf 1. 
Such reasoning is improper and errs in the following ways. While it is elementary 
that a search warrant may not issue in the absence of probable cause, see e.g., Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967), the probable cause analysis of an anticipatory 
warrant differs from the analysis of a traditional search warrant. See generally, Validity of 
Anticipatory Search Warrants-State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, § 2b (2002). "Anticipatory 
warrants differ from traditional search warrants in that at the time of issuance they are not 
supported by probable cause to believe that contraband is currently located at the place to 
be searched;' Womack, 967 P.2d at 543 (citing Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). "As with 
other search warrants, however, anticipatory warrants must be supported by probable 
cause." Id. Consequently, "[b]efore issuing an anticipatory warrant the magistrate must 
determine, based on the information presented in the warrant application, that there 
is probable cause to believe the items to be seized will be at the designated place when 
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the search is to take place." Id. (emphasis added). 
Moreover, "the magistrate must not abandon the juristic role of assessing probable 
cause by depending on police guarantees that the search will not be done unless there is 
probable cause." Id. at 544. "The magistrate must instead demand that police specifically 
show, on the facts existing when the magistrate issues the warrant, that the evidence 
to be confiscated will be at the named place when the search occurs." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, the trial court applied an improper standard in determining whether 
there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. In making the determination, the 
trial court speculate and attempted to rewrite the warrant after the fact. This is evident by 
the court's acknowledgment that "the affidavit failed to recite that the officers expected 
Penn to accept the offer of drugs," but reasoned that the "magistrate clearly intended that 
acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for execution of the warrant..." R. 481, % 1. 
Such reasoning goes against absolute black letter law that one must not speculate as to 
what was in the mind of the magistrate or based upon after-acquired information. Instead, 
the test is what is contained in the four corners of the document itself. See State v. 
Saddler, 2003 UT App. f 7 (noting that reviewing court is bound by the contents of the 
affidavit"); State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955-56 and n.4 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that 
determination of probable cause is based on whether there "were enough facts within the 
affidavit" and that courts "are bound by the contents of the affidavit"). 
The conditions set forth in the four-corners of the affidavit used in this case clearly 
do not give rise to probable cause that any crime would be committed or that any illegal 
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controlled substance would be found at the named location. The supporting affidavit and 
anticipated information shows only that the agent or the CI would offer the mushrooms to 
Penn. There was absolutely no condition precedent to the search that Penn actually 
acquire possession of drugs or actually commit any crime. Simply put, this warrant 
authorized a search regardless of how Penn responded to the agents, and the meager 
information presented to the magistrate could be used to justify a search of any residence 
so long as the government states it is going to take drugs to a location and make a mere 
offer to the resident. 
Further, despite a condition that the CFs vehicle and person would be searched 
prior to entry, and re-searched subsequently, there is no condition explaining what should 
(or should not) be found in this search prior to entry of the house, nor that the mushrooms 
should not be present upon leaving the residence. Thus, the warrant authorized a search 
even if the defendant refused the illegal substance. 
Ultimately, the plain language of the affidavit required Penn to commit absolutely 
no illegal act in order for the search to proceed. All triggering events were solely in the 
hands of the agents and the CI. Penn could have refused the mushrooms, told the 
individuals to leave, and after being thrown out of the house with the mushrooms still in 
their custody, the warrant would have nonetheless authorized the search. Consequently, 
the anticipatory warrant was not supported by probable cause and therefore, invalid. 
B. The Requisite "Triggering Events" Did Not Occur 
Again, because anticipatory warrants attempt to predict future probable cause, 
"[pjrobable cause to support anticipatory warrants is conditioned on the occurrence of 
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certain expected or triggering events, typically the future delivery, sale, or purchase of 
contraband." Womack, 967 P.2d. at 543 (internal quotations omitted). "Because the 
probable cause underlying an anticipatory warrant depends on whether certain events 
occur, the warrant or affidavit must state conditions allowing the search to be done only 
after those expected events occur." Id. at 543-44 (citing Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1201). 
"This not only ensures against premature execution of the warrant, but also maintains 
judicial control over the probable cause determination and over the circumstances of the 
warrant's execution." Id. at 544. "Consistent with these goals, the conditions controlling 
the warrant's execution should be explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid 
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents." Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)(emphasis added). Importantly, an "anticipatory warrant is invalid 
if the 'triggering event5 does not arise." Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
In rejecting the argument that the warrant was invalid since the "triggering events" 
did not occur, the district court again speculates as to the intention of the magistrate: 
Even though the affiant [in the affidavit in support of the warrant] 
said that the confidential informant and her car would be 
searched, the warrant did not clearly specify that the search must 
occur before the warrant would be valid. Had that question been 
specifically addressed.. .the magistrate would not have 
conditioned the warrant's validity on the search having 
previously occurred, especially given that a DEA agent was to 
personally participate in the transaction. 
R. 481, H 2. 
Again, the law requires a court to review the four corners of the supporting 
affidavit, rather than speculate about the intention of the magistrate. See State v. Saddler, 
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2003 UT App. % 7; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955-56 and n.4 (Utah App. 1993). 
Thus, the district court's approach of rewriting the document is contrary to all established 
case law and must be rejected. 
Moreover, if, as the district court reasons, the anticipatory warrant's conditions 
were not clear, then the warrant is invalid on this basis alone. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 
544. 
More importantly, however, the anticipatory warrant here contained explicit 
language that the warrant's validity depended "upon the occurrence of the events 
described in the affidavit," which included the re-searching of the CI, the undercover 
agent, and the CFs vehicle. Such events were necessary to ensure that a crime had 
actually been committed, that Penn had actually accepted the mushrooms (rather than 
perhaps, putting them back into the possession of the agents), and that the agents had not 
impermissibly secreted the illegal substance for personal reasons. The re-searching of the 
named persons and locations clearly did not take place before the warrant was executed. 
The warrant was therefore rendered invalid, its execution was illegal and the evidence 
obtained as a result should have been suppressed. 
C. Information Used To Support Probable Cause Was 
Improperly Obtained And Was Materially Deficient 
Of Information About The CI. 
The anticipatory warrant was also invalid since information used in the affidavit to 
support probable cause was improperly obtained, and was completely void of any 
information regarding the reliability, basis of knowledge and veracity of the CI. 
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1. Improperly obtained information renders the 
affidavit lacking in probable cause. 
Probable cause for the warrant was supported in part, by information illegally 
obtained by the CI while an agent of the police.10 Admittedly, "[t]he fourth amendment 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures protects only against governmental 
actions and does not extend to the independent acts of private citizens." State v. 
McArthur, 996 P.2d 555, 560 (Utah App. 2000). "However, a search conducted by a 
private person acting as a government agent is not a private search." Id. at 560 (internal 
quotations and brackets omitted). "In such an instance, the protections of the fourth 
amendment do have application." Id. See also State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 
1988); State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). 
Moreover, although "the Fourth Amendment allows undercover police agents to 
conduct warrantless searches in places to which they have been invited, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the search not exceed the scope of the invitation." Id. at 562. 
"If he or she is invited onto private property, a government agent does not need probable 
cause nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the scope of his invitation." Id. 
However, "once inside the house, an agent may not exceed the scope of his invitation by 
ransacking the house generally, but he may seize anything in plain view." Id. (internal 
,0More specifically, the affidavit in support of the warrant states: 
Approximately two weeks ago, CI was in the residence 
described above as 300 East 300 South, Moab, Grand County, 
Utah, and saw some multi-dose vials of Demerol in their 
refrigerator. CI also saw some oxycontin in a prescription bottle, 
labeled with the name of Robert Silver, in the bathroom. 
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brackets omitted). 
In this case, after signing an official agreement with the DEA to become an 
informant, LaPlante went into the Drew/Penn residence and searched the home, including 
the refrigerator and bathroom cabinets, to look for Demerol and Lortab. Such information 
was part of the information LaPlante was expected to provide to the DEA. LaPlante 
admitted she was looking to see if there were drugs to report to the DEA. LaPlante also 
admitted that although she initially went in the residence to look for the key, she decided 
to expand the search for the purpose of looking for evidence of drug possession. 
LaPlante's observations were used in the affidavit to support the search warrant. Because 
LaPlante's search was improper, however, any information obtained as a result should 
have been stricken. When such information is excised, the result is that there is absolutely 
no basis to search Penn's home for demoral, hydrocodone, or any other medically 
prescribed controlled substance. 
2. The affidavit contained materially deficient 
information regarding the CL 
Probable cause is also lacking since the affidavit in support of the warrant was 
completely void of information concerning the CI. "Where, as here, information obtained 
from an informant is the primary support for the search warrant, an analysis of the totality 
of the circumstances requires [the court] to consider the three factors... articulated 
Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)." Saddler, 2003 
UT App 82, at If 10. These factors include: 1) the type of informant and her basis of 
knowledge; 2) information detail, and 3) confirmation of information by a police officer. 
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See id. atffi| 11, 20, 22.11 
Here, a review of the affidavit not only shows a failure to meet the Mulcahy 
factors, but there is quite simply nothing to analyze in that there is absolutely no 
information about the CI provided. The issuing magistrate was given absolutely no 
indication of the reliability or veracity of the CI, how the CI and law enforcement agents 
came into contact, the reasons the CI is providing information, nor any revelation of the 
promises or consideration given to the CI in exchange for information.12 The affidavit is 
also completely void of any information regarding the foundation or basis of knowledge 
for the CFs alleged observations, whether the CI made the observations legally, and does 
not set forth in any way independent corroboration of the CFs information by law 
enforcement. Consequently, under the totality of circumstances, the warrant affidavit 
failed to establish probable cause to search Penn's residence and the district court erred in 
admitting the evidence seized as a result. 
nFor the proposition that information concerning the confidential informant is 
relevant to a court's probable cause determination in authorizing a search warrant, see 
e.g., State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 
1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah App. 
1989). Also accord Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
I2A "police informant" is one who either gains information through involvement in 
criminal activity or one who is motivated by pecuniary gain. See Saddler, 2003 UT App 
82, at f 13. Such informant is automatically "lower on the reliability scale." Id. In this 
case, the CI was not only financially compensated, but had struck a deal to get her 
husband's felony case dismissed. The information she used to negotiate her deal 
(allegations that Penn was wrongfully prescribing medications and distributing controlled 
substances) turned out to be untrue and unable to be corroborated. 
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E. Insofar As Issues Concerning The Warrant's Invalidity 
Were Not Raised By Trial Counsel, Such Constitutes 
Ineffective Assistance And/Or Was The Result Of State 
Discovery Violations. 
As noted previously, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress on September 5, 
2002. Insofar as counsel failed to fully raise the issues that the triggering events 
necessary to the validity of the warrant did not occur and that the warrant was not 
supported by probable cause due to an utter lack of information about the CI, such failure 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and/or may be the product of the failure of 
the state to provide material information.13 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have assistance 
of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., amend VI. See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). With regard to claims of ineffective assistance, Utah courts follow 
the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984 ). See 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. In proving an ineffective assistance claim, therefore, the 
claimant must show that: 1) counsel's errors "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness;" and 2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 186-
187. Importantly, the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence may appropriately form 
the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, All 
U.S. 365 (1986); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (failure to timely file a 
,3Issues concerning the state's failure to provided material information is discussed 
in detail below. 
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meritorious motion to suppress requires new trial). To prevail on this claim, the defendant 
must demonstrate that the motion was meritorious and would have affected the outcome 
of the trial. 
As set forth in substantive detail above, a motion to suppress should have been 
filed concerning the absence of requisite triggering events14 and the fact that the warrant 
was substantially based on information from a CI about which there was absolutely no 
information given. These claims are meritorious, justify suppression of the evidence 
seized, and would have affected the outcome of the case. 
III. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL 
INFORMATION WARRANTS REVERSAL. 
"It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in 
its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment." 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987). A prosecutor is bound by ethical duties 
as well. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.8(d). Indeed, a prosecutor's failure to disclose 
material evidence violates a defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as due process under 
the Utah State Constitution. See e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 423-33 (1995); United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976); 
14We are left to speculate in this case as to why such claims were not raised by 
counsel. In any event, as will be set forth below, the state had a duty to provide 
exculpatory information which, in this case, would include disclosure of the fact that the 
triggering events of the anticipatory search warrant did not occur. 
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Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691092 (Utah 1981); UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7.15 This 
obligation to disclose applies equally to impeachment and credibility evidence and to 
evidence that was not requested by the defense. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 
280 (1999); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).16 Moreover, a conviction simply cannot stand scrutiny under 
the Fourteenth Amendment if the prosecution allows false evidence to go uncorrected 
even if it did not solicit the evidence through direct examination and even if the evidence 
goes only to the issue of impeachment of a witness. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 
269(1959). 
Of importance, the state's obligation to disclose is not limited to information in the 
custody of the prosecutor. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. The individual prosecutor must 
learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the 
case, including the police. See id. 
15In addition, under Utah discovery law, upon request by the defendant, the 
prosecution is required to disclose 1) the relevant written or recorded statements of a co-
defendant; and 2) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment. "The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure." 
U.R.Cr.P., Rule 16(b); Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F.Supp.2d 1151,1173-74 (D. Utah 1999). 
16As noted, the United States Supreme Court has also applied this rule to 
impeachment evidence. See e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). This 
is so because "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of 
guilt or innocence' non-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within th[e] 
general rule [of Brady.]" Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 
(explaining that "such evidence is 'evidence favorable to an accused,' ... so that, if 
disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and 
acquittal"). 
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The failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence warrants remedy when there is 
prejudice to the Defendant. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. Prejudice occurs when the 
failure to disclose affects basic fundamental rights-such as a right to a fair trial. See 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). The right to a fair trial is undermined 
when the undisclosed evidence is material, meaning, where "there is reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682. A "showing of materiality" however, 
"does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed 
evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
434. The question is "not whether the defendant would more likely than not have 
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a 
fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, the State failed to disclose material information in violation of its 
absolute duty on several fronts including: 1) the specific deal made between the County 
Attorney and confidential informant LaPlante to make the pending charges against 
LaPlante's husband "go away;" 2) financial compensation given to LaPlante by the DEA 
for her cooperation and testimony; 3) reports concerning additional charges investigated 
but never filed against Gene LaPlante; and 4) investigative reports of interviews of 
additional witnesses. 
First and foremost, the State never disclosed to the defense the actual deal it had 
made with the State's main witness and informant, Lisa LaPlante. Non-disclosure of such 
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a vital piece of information carries with it numerous facets of impropriety in this case. 
Not until after trial was it discovered for the first time that LaPlante had specifically 
received a "deal" for her husband in exchange for her cooperation and testimony against 
Penn. Nor was it discovered until after trial that the DEA had financially compensated 
LaPlante. The terms under which LaPlante negotiated and received that consideration is 
clearly a factor to be weighed by the jury in determining her reliability. 
Because "cross-examination for bias is 'so vital a constitutional right/" it is 
elementary that the potential bias or motive of a witness is always an appropriate issue for 
jury consideration. See e.g., State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) and noting that "full exposure of a witness1 
bias or prejudice is essentiaF'to the constitutionally protected rights of confrontation and 
cross-examination). The importance of bias or motive evidence increases in a credibility 
contest of this nature where there was sharp contrast between the testimony of LaPlante 
and that of Penn and Drew. LaPlante's credibility was a critical issue not only in regard to 
the entire case, but most specifically to the jury's consideration as to whether Penn was 
entrapped into possessing mushrooms by her conduct. 
Perhaps most importantly, there is an affirmative duty imposed upon the State to 
absolutely disclose this type of information. While the ultimate disposition of Mr. 
LaPlante's case was a matter of public record, the express agreement and what that 
agreement entailed, was not. Indeed, the fact that trial counsel discovered the disposition 
of Mr. LaPlante's felony assault case in no way modifies or eliminates the duty of the 
State to disclose the terms of the deal between the County Attorney and his key witness. 
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It is true that Penn's trial counsel questioned LaPlante about the disposition of her 
husband's case in hopes that the jury would infer the plea arrangement was the result of 
LaPlante's cooperation and testimony. Trial counsel went no further, however, never 
inquiring as to whether there was a specific deal that had been made.17 Given what trial 
counsel knew at the time, the most he could hope for was that the jury would draw the 
desired inference.I8 However, the jury trial was absolutely undermined since the deal and 
its terms were never disclosed, trial counsel was unable to fully explore the issue and 
consequently, the jury was presented insufficient information to assess LaPlante's true 
interest and bias. Cf State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656 (mere knowledge of immunity 
grant insufficient to assess bias and full explanation necessary as to details of deal). 
Additionally, the state went beyond mere non-disclosure, but actually argued 
dishonestly to the jury that LaPlante had come forward to law enforcement out of mere 
1
 insofar as trial counsel did not specifically question the witness at trial regarding 
any deals made with the prosecution, this may arguably constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel based on a failure to properly investigate and impeach the witness. See e.g., 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (discussing trial counsel duty to investigate); Taylor v. 
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 283 (Utah 1995) ("Sufficient performance requires that counsel 
adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case"); State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1255 
(Utah 1993); Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. It is critical to recognize, however, that the most 
important witness in the trial had a motive for her testimony that was not fully disclosed 
by the State. Where the ultimate blame is placed is less important than the fact that, for 
whatever reason, the jury was not given information that very well may have changed the 
outcome of the case. 
i8In denying the motion for a new trial, the district court speculates as to strategic 
reasons trial counsel may not have wanted to present such information. See R. 483. The 
court's speculation is deficient in two respects. First, it is contrary to trial counsel's 
affidavit. See R. 403-404. Second, there is simply no reason why it would be in Penn's 
interest to have an inference instead of the fact. 
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concern that Penn was consuming and wrongfully prescribing controlled substances. See 
R. 506 at 45-46. The prosecutor did so knowing full well the deal it had made with its star 
witness. Had the jury been apprized of the true facts and motivation for her testimony, 
however, "it might well have concluded that [LaPlante] had fabricated testimony in order 
to curry the favor of the very representative of the State who was prosecuting the case in 
which [she] was testifying." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959). Such 
impermissible actions undermine the fairness of the trial, prejudiced Penn, and this Court 
should therefore reverse this case. Cf Napue, 360 U.S. at 272.. 
With regard to the cash payments made by the DEA to LaPlante, there is no reason 
to speculate as to why trial counsel did not cross-examine LaPlante about the payments at 
trial. It is uncontroverted that the existence of those payments was only revealed after the 
trial was over. Combined with the failure to reveal the other material aspects of "the deal" 
made with State, the lack of disclosure of cash payments definitely calls into question the 
fairness of this trial. 
Finally, government investigators prepared additional reports of witness interviews 
that was not disclosed to the defense. More specifically, Investigator Johnson personally 
prepared reports of interviews with Angie Stoughton, Marie Packard, and pharmacist 
Mike Goyne. See R. 403-404; 502, Exhibit 6 at 31, 39-40, 45-47; 505 at 47-50. These 
reports contained material details about the government's investigation of Penn, and 
undisclosed information of at least one witness who testified at trial. Consequently, the 
collective impact of all the numerous discovery violations warrants reversal. 
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IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PREJUDICIAL 
AND IRRELEVANT "BAD ACTS" EVIDENCE. 
In this case, Penn clearly raised the affirmative defense of entrapment. See Utah 
Code. Ann. § 76-2-303(6). Nevertheless, because entrapment under Utah law is analyzed 
under an objective standard, the propensities and predisposition of the defendant is not the 
focus, see State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), and bad acts evidence is still not 
permitted in the State's case-in-chief. See State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Utah 
1988) (citing State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1978)). Consequently, the trial 
court erred in allowing highly prejudicial and unsubstantiated allegations of prior drug 
use, distribution, inferred "prescription fraud," and other allegations over the objection of 
defense counsel.19 Such bad acts evidence was improper under Utah Rule of Evidence 
19Specifically, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to elicit testimony that 
included the following irrelevant and prejudicial accusations: 
• LaPlante testified that many people in the area were addicted to 
Oxycontin and now "their source of oxycontin is gone," see R. 506 at 136; 
• LaPlante testified her husband was "losing his mind" because of the 
oxycontin Penn gave him, see R. 506 at 136; 
• allegations that Penn attempted to commit suicide, see R. 506 at 64; 
• allegations that LaPlante found Penn one time in a room of the clinic 
sleeping, with a tourniquet-like object and bent needles on floor, see R. 506 
at 65; 
• allegations from LaPlante that at times Penn acted weird all day, would 
walk into walls, and would dictate but not recall what he was talking about 
or the patients he had seen, see R. 506 at 65; 
• that Penn and Drew used mushrooms on a previous occasion, see R. 506 at 
65-66; 
• that Penn engaged in illegal prescription practices, see R. 506 at 149; 
that Penn was a public safety concern, see R. 506 at 149; 
• allegations that Penn lost prior hospital privileges due to drug issues, see R. 
507 at 70-71; and 
• discussion of need for anticipatory warrant so Penn would not inject or 
destroy evidence, see R. 506 at 153. 
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Rule 404(b), and irrelevant, prejudicial, and misdirected the jury's focus from the true 
issues of the case. See Ut. R. Evid. 404, 403, 402. 
Utah courts "rigorously appl[y] the rule that evidence of a defendant's prior crimes 
or bad acts is not admissible to show criminal propensity in a criminal case." State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989). "Such evidence may be admitted only if the 
evidence has a very high degree of probativeness with respect to a particular element of 
the crime charged and will not otherwise result in undue prejudice." Id. (emphasis added). 
This is so because "[o]ur criminal justice system is concerned with whether a defendant 
committed a particular criminal act, not whether the defendant is an unregenerate person 
who has failed in the past to adhere to the various customs and laws of our society." Id. at 
964, 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally governs the admissibility of bad acts 
evidence and states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice 
in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Ut.R. Evid. 404(b) (2001). 
Accordingly, before admitting bad acts evidence, the trial court must engage in a 
"scrupulous examination" of the evidence outside the presence of the jury in order to 
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exercise its discretion. See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^  24 (citing cases); State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 42, "In determining whether bad acts evidence is admissible, the 
trial court must first determine whether the bad acts evidence is being offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b)." 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 6 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Utah 2000). If the court resolves that the 
evidence is being offered for a proper purpose, the court then moves on to determine 
whether the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of Rules of Evidence 402 and 
403.20 Id. See also State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 842 (Utah 1999). 
In this case, such "scrupulous examination" was not upheld. First, there was an 
insufficient showing that the evidence was properly offered for a non-character purpose. 
The State proffered that some of the evidence explained why the DEA was involved in 
the matter. See R. 506 at 65; R. 507 at 14. Other times no explanation was offered. In any 
event, such blatantly prejudicial information was not necessary to prove the State's case. 
It becomes more clear that the State offered a minor portion of the prior acts testimony in 
order to argue that Penn's record-keeping practices amounted to illegal possession. 
However, allegations of prior drug use, attempted suicide, loss of hospital privileges and 
accusations of illegal distribution had no proper purpose other than to inflame the jury. 
Secondly, even if we were to assume that the State offered the evidence for some 
proper, non-character reason, the testimony was absolutely irrelevant to the true issues of 
20The 2001 amendment to Rule 404(b) deleted the specific reference to compliance 
with Rules 402 and 403, but the Advisory Committee Note states that "Evidence sought 
to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be 
admissible." 
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case. No link was ever made between the prejudicial testimony and a material fact to the 
crime charged. Again, obscure allegations of past drug use, accusations of prescription 
fraud or distribution, and allegations of attempted suicide had absolutely no relevance as 
to whether Penn illegally possessed demerol, hydrocodone, and psilocin on April 20, 
2003. The introduction of such testimony unfairly forced Penn to focus his attention on 
countering the onslaught of accusations of past wrongdoing, rather than focusing on the 
present charges. Such blatantly irrelevant testimony should never have been allowed. 
Finally, any possible probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger 
of misleading the jury and unfair prejudice. In this case, the damning impact of 
allegations that a physician was using controlled substances while treating patients, and 
was illegally prescribing narcotics to addicted patients, are clear and are of the type that 
would inherently incite anger and hostility. Moreover, the strength and reliability of the 
evidence was suspect, as most came from a confidential informant who had a great deal at 
stake in helping the State convict Penn. There was also simply no need for the testimony 
but to inflame and mislead the jury. Especially with regard to the allegations of 
prescription fraud, the jury was misled to believe that the allegations were relevant to the 
"improper record-keeping" charges. However, as noted at great length above, record-
keeping practices of Penn at his clinic had absolutely no relevance as to whether or not he 
illegally possessed the charged controlled substances on April 20, 2002. The numerous 
allegations made against a physician engendered hostility, and the moment this testimony 
was presented, the presumption of innocence was destroyed. From that point on, the 
evidence misdirected the jury's focus from the real issues of the case. Thus, because the 
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trial court did not "scrupulously examine" this highly prejudicial evidence, this Court 
should find reversible error. 
V. STATEMENTS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF 
MIRANDA SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
During the execution of the search warrant, statements were elicited from Penn in 
violation of Miranda and should have been excluded. A Miranda warning is required 
once a suspect is "in custody," or has otherwise been significantly deprived of his 
freedom. See State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah App. 1992); Salt Lake City v. 
Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). Also accord Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); California v. Beheler, 
463 U.S. 1121,1123-25 (1983). In determining whether an individual is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes, Utah courts consider five telling factors: (1) the site of the interro-
gation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to leave; (4) the length and form of the interrogation; and (5) 
whether the suspect freely came to the place of interrogation. See Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 
998-999. 
Here, Penn was clearly in custody and made statements in response to questioning 
by officers. At the time of the questioning concerning the contraband, officers had entered 
Penn's residence, Penn had been handcuffed and was placed under the direct supervision 
of at least one agent while other officers searched his home. He was not free to leave and 
was suspected of criminal activity. Additionally, there was express questioning regarding 
the location of contraband inside the house with "words and actions" likely to elicit a 
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response. Indeed, officers asked repeatedly where the drugs were located, and when Penn 
denied knowledge, the officers replied that they knew he had just purchased mushrooms, 
that they had a search warrant, and that it would be to his benefit to tell where they were. 
In that situation, the police were required to provide the Miranda safeguards, and based 
on these facts, the failure to give Miranda warnings would have resulted in the 
suppression of Penn's initial statement to the police at his home had trial counsel filed a 
motion to suppress. 
Moreover, based on authority stated previously, trial counsel's failure to raise such 
issue constitutes ineffective assistance. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 35, 359 (Utah App. 
1993) (failure to timely file a meritorious motion to suppress statements on Miranda 
grounds requires new trial). A reading of the police reports should have at least prompted 
counsel to conduct further investigation or file the motion to suppress. There could be no 
tactical reason not to seek suppression, because trial counsel did seek to exclude evidence 
on other unrelated theories. Had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the statements on 
Fifth Amendment grounds, there is a strong likelihood that this motion would have been 
granted. 
VI. CUMULATIVE ERROR UNDERMINED THE FAIRNESS 
OF THE TRIAL AND SENTENCE. 
Alternatively, if this Court determines that the errors set forth above do not 
individually warrant reversal, this Court should nevertheless find that the cumulative 
effect of all such errors do. In assessing a cumulative error claim, this Court considers all 
the identified errors as well as any others assumed to have occurred to determine if the 
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result was a fundamentally unfair trial. See State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7, 15 (Utah 2000) 
This case epitomizes the fundamentally unfair trial. The erroneous jury 
instructions alone impact Penn's rights to a fair trial, to be given notice of the charges 
against him, to have a preliminary hearing, and for the State to meet its burden of proving 
a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Combine with these constitutional 
violations the failure of the anticipatory warrant to issue only upon probable cause, the 
failure of the State to fulfill its obligation to provide material information to the defense, 
and the failure of agents to provide Miranda warnings as a fundamental protection against 
self-incrimination, and it becomes evident that this case runs the gamut of statutory, 
procedural and constitutional error. All of these errors combined to produce a 
fundamentally unfair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that material reversible errors were 
made in this case that prejudiced the outcome of this trial. As such, this Court should 
vacate Penn's conviction on Counts II and III, due to insufficient evidence, and remand 
the remainder of the case for a new trial. 
I *~ d DATED this / ~ day of November 2003. 
? 
S C. BRADSHAW 
MARIE TALIAFERRO 
orneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-6 License to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, 
administer, or conduct research -Issuance by department -Denial, suspension, or revocation -
Records required -Prescriptions. 
(1) (a) The department may adopt rules relating to the licensing and control of the manufacture, 
distribution, production, prescription, administration, dispensing, conducting of research with, 
and performing of laboratory analysis upon controlled substances within this state. 
(b) The department may assess reasonable fees to defray the cost of issuing original and renewal 
licenses under this chapter pursuant to Section 63-38- 3.2. 
(c) The director of the department may delegate to any division or agency within the department, 
authority to perform the responsibilities and functions prescribed to the department under this 
chapter if the delegated authority is consistent with the function of the division or agency 
provided by law. 
(2) (a) (i) Every person who manufactures, produces, distributes, prescribes, dispenses, 
administers, conducts research with, or performs laboratory analysis upon any controlled 
substance in Schedules II through V within this state, or who proposes to engage in 
manufacturing, producing, distributing, prescribing, dispensing, administering, conducting 
research with, or performing laboratory analysis upon controlled substances included in 
Schedules II through V within this state shall obtain a license issued by the department, 
(ii) The division shall issue each license under this chapter in accordance with a two-year 
renewal cycle established by rule. The division may by rule extend or shorten a renewal period by 
as much as one year to stagger the renewal cycles it administers. 
(b) Persons licensed to manufacture, produce, distribute, prescribe, dispense, administer, conduct 
research with, or perform laboratory analysis upon controlled substances in Schedules II through 
V within this state may possess, manufacture, produce, distribute, prescribe, dispense, 
administer, conduct research with, or perform laboratory analysis upon those substances to the 
extent authorized by their license and in conformity with this chapter. 
(c) The following persons are not required to obtain a license and may lawfully possess 
controlled substances under this section: 
(i) an agent or employee, except a sales representative, of any registered manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser of any controlled substance, if the agent or employee is acting in the 
usual course of his business or employment; however, nothing in this subsection shall be 
interpreted to permit an agent, employee, sales representative, or detail man to maintain an 
inventory of controlled substances separate from the location of his employer's registered and 
licensed place of business; 
(ii) a motor carrier or warehouseman, or an employee of a motor carrier or warehouseman, who 
possesses any controlled substance in the usual course of his business or employment; and 
(iii) an ultimate user, or any person who possesses any controlled substance pursuant to a lawful 
order of a practitioner. 
(d) The department may enact rules waiving the license requirement for certain manufacturers, 
producers, distributors, prescribers, dispensers, administrators, research practitioners, or 
laboratories performing analysis if consistent with the public health and safety. 
(e) A separate license is required at each principal place of business or professional practice 
where the applicant manufactures, produces, distributes, prescribes, dispenses, administers, 
conducts research with, or performs laboratory analysis upon controlled substances. 
(f) The department may enact rules providing for the inspection of a licensee or applicant's 
establishment, and may inspect the establishment according to those rules. 
(3) (a) Upon proper application, the department shall license a qualified applicant to 
manufacture, produce, distribute, conduct research with, or perform laboratory analysis upon 
controlled substances included in Schedules I through V, unless it determines that issuance of a 
license is inconsistent with the public interest. The department shall not issue a license to any 
person to prescribe, dispense, or administer a Schedule I controlled substance. In determining 
public interest, the department shall consider whether or not the applicant has: 
(i) maintained effective controls against diversion of controlled substances and any Schedule I or 
II substance compounded from any controlled substance into other than legitimate medical, 
scientific, or industrial channels; 
(ii) complied with applicable state and local law; 
(iii) been convicted under federal or state laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensing of substances; 
(iv) past experience in the manufacture of controlled dangerous substances; 
(v) established effective controls against diversion; and 
(vi) complied with any other factors that the department establishes that promote the public 
health and safety. 
(b) Licenses granted under Subsection (3)(a) do not entitle a licensee to manufacture, produce, 
distribute, conduct research with, or perform laboratory analysis upon controlled substances in 
Schedule I other than those specified in the license. 
(c) (i) Practitioners shall be licensed to administer, dispense, or conduct research with substances 
in Schedules II through V if they are authorized to administer, dispense, or conduct research 
under the laws of this state. 
(ii) The department need not require a separate license for practitioners engaging in research with 
nonnarcotic controlled substances in Schedules II through V where the licensee is already 
licensed under this act in another capacity. 
(iii) With respect to research involving narcotic substances in Schedules II through V, or where 
the department by rule requires a separate license for research of nonnarcotic substances in 
Schedules II through V, a practitioner shall apply to the department prior to conducting research, 
(iv) Licensing for purposes of bona fide research with controlled substances by a practitioner 
considered qualified may be denied only on a ground specified in Subsection (4), or upon 
evidence that the applicant will abuse or unlawfully transfer or fail to safeguard adequately his 
supply of substances against diversion from medical or scientific use. 
(v) Practitioners registered under federal law to conduct research in Schedule I substances may 
conduct research in Schedule I substances within this state upon furnishing the department 
evidence of federal registration. 
(d) Compliance by manufacturers, producers, and distributors with the provisions of federal law 
respecting registration, excluding fees, entitles them to be licensed under this chapter. 
(e) The department shall initially license those persons who own or operate an establishment 
engaged in the manufacture, production, distribution, dispensation, or administration of 
controlled substances prior to April 3,1980, and who are licensed by the state. 
(4) (a) Any license pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) may be denied, suspended, placed on 
probation, or revoked by the department upon finding that the applicant or licensee has: 
(i) materially falsified any application filed or required pursuant to this chapter; 
(ii) been convicted of an offense under this chapter or any law of the United States, or any state, 
relating to any substance defined as a controlled substance; 
(iii) been convicted of a felony under any other law of the United States or any state within five 
years of the date of the issuance of the license; 
(iv) had a federal license denied, suspended, or revoked by competent federal authority and is no 
longer authorized to engage in the manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances; 
(v) had his license suspended or revoked by competent authority of another state for violation of 
laws or regulations comparable to those of this state relating to the manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensing of controlled substances; 
(vi) violated any department rule that reflects adversely on the licensee's reliability and integrity 
with respect to controlled substances; 
(vii) refused inspection of records required to be maintained under this chapter by a person 
authorized to inspect them; or 
(viii) prescribed, dispensed, administered, or injected an anabolic steroid for the purpose of 
manipulating human hormonal structure so as to: 
(A) increase muscle mass, strength, or weight without medical necessity and without a written 
prescription by any practitioner in the course of his professional practice; or 
(B) improve performance in any form of human exercise, sport, or game. 
(b) The department may limit revocation or suspension of a license to a particular controlled 
substance with respect to which grounds for revocation or suspension exist. 
(c) (i) Proceedings to deny, revoke, or suspend a license shall be conducted pursuant to this 
section and in accordance with the procedures set forth in Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, and conducted in conjunction with the appropriate 
representative committee designated by the director of the department. 
(ii) Nothing in this Subsection (4)(c) gives the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing exclusive authority in proceedings to deny, revoke, or suspend licenses, except where 
the department is designated by law to perform those functions, or, when not designated by law, 
is designated by the executive director of the Department of Commerce to conduct the proceedings. 
(d) (i) The department may suspend any license simultaneously with the institution of 
proceedings under this section if it finds there is an imminent danger to the public health or safety, 
(ii) Suspension shall continue in effect until the conclusion of proceedings, including judicial 
review, unless withdrawn by the department or dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(e) (i) If a license is suspended or revoked under this Subsection (4), all controlled substances 
owned or possessed by the licensee may be placed under seal in the discretion of the department, 
(ii) Disposition may not be made of substances under seal until the time for taking an appeal has 
lapsed, or until all appeals have been concluded, unless a court, upon application, orders the sale 
of perishable substances and the proceeds deposited with the court. 
(iii) If a revocation order becomes final, all controlled substances shall be forfeited. 
(f) The department shall notify promptly the Drug Enforcement Administration of all orders 
suspending or revoking a license and all forfeitures of controlled substances. 
(5) (a) Persons licensed under Subsection (2) or (3) shall maintain records and inventories in 
conformance with the record keeping and inventory requirements of federal and state law and any 
additional rules issued by the department. 
(b) (i) Every physician, dentist, veterinarian, practitioner, or other person who is authorized to 
administer or professionally use a controlled substance shall keep a record of the drugs received 
by him and a record of all drugs administered, dispensed, or professionally used by him 
otherwise than by a prescription. 
(ii) A person using small quantities or solutions or other preparations of those drugs for local 
application has complied with this Subsection (5)(b) if he keeps a record of the quantity, 
character, and potency of those solutions or preparations purchased or prepared by him, and of 
the dates when purchased or prepared. 
(6) Controlled substances in Schedules I through V may be distributed only by a licensee and 
pursuant to an order form prepared in compliance with department rules or a lawful order under 
the rules and regulations of the United States. 
(7) (a) A person may not write or authorize a prescription for a controlled substance unless he is: 
(i) a practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs and medicine under the laws of this state or under 
the laws of another state having similar standards; and 
(ii) licensed under this chapter or under the laws of another state having similar standards. 
(b) A person other than a pharmacist licensed under the laws of this state, or his licensed intern, 
as required by Section 58-17a-302, may not dispense a controlled substance. 
(c) (i) A controlled substance may not be dispensed without the written prescription of a 
practitioner, if the written prescription is required by the federal Controlled Substances Act. 
(ii) That written prescription shall be made in accordance with Subsection (7)(a) and in 
conformity with Subsection (7)(d). 
(iii) In emergency situations, as defined by department rule, controlled substances may be 
dispensed upon oral prescription of a practitioner, if reduced promptly to writing on forms 
designated by the department and filed by the pharmacy. 
(iv) Prescriptions reduced to writing by a pharmacist shall be in conformity with Subsection (7)(d). 
(d) Except for emergency situations designated by the department, a person may not issue, fill, 
compound, or dispense a prescription for a controlled substance unless the prescription is signed 
in ink or indelible pencil by the prescriber and contains the following information: 
(i) the name, address, and registry number of the prescribes 
(ii) the name, address, and age of the person to whom or for whom the prescription is issued; 
(iii) the date of issuance of the prescription; and 
(iv) the name, quantity, and specific directions for use by the ultimate user of the controlled substance. 
(e) A prescription may not be written, issued, filled, or dispensed for a Schedule I controlled substance. 
(f) Except when administered directly to an ultimate user by a licensed practitioner, controlled 
substances are subject to the following restrictions: 
(i) (A) A prescription for a Schedule II substance may not be refilled. 
(B) A Schedule II controlled substance may not be filled in a quantity to exceed a one-month's 
supply, as directed on the daily dosage rate of the prescriptions. 
(ii) A Schedule III or IV controlled substance may be filled only within six months of issuance, 
and may not be refilled more than six months after the date of its original issuance or be refilled 
more than five times after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner. 
(iii) All other controlled substances in Schedule V may be refilled as the preserver's prescription 
directs, but they may not be refilled one year after the date the prescription was issued unless 
renewed by the practitioner. 
(iv) Any prescription for a Schedule II substance may not be dispensed if it is not presented to a 
pharmacist for dispensing by a pharmacist or a pharmacy intern within 30 days after the date the 
prescription was issued, or 30 days after the dispensing date, if that date is specified separately 
from the date of issue. 
(v) A practitioner may issue more than one prescription at the same time for the same Schedule II 
controlled substance, but only under the following conditions: 
(A) no more than three prescriptions for the same Schedule II controlled substance may be issued 
at the same time; 
(B) no one prescription may exceed a 30-day supply; 
(C) a second or third prescription shall include the date of issuance and the date for dispensing; and 
(D) unless the practitioner determines there is a valid medical reason to the contrary, the date for 
dispensing a second or third prescription may not be fewer than 30 days from the dispensing date 
of the previous prescription. 
(vi) Each prescription for a controlled substance may contain only one controlled substance per 
prescription form and may not contain any other legend drug or prescription item. 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for use by an inpatient or an 
outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from all requirements of this Subsection (7) if the 
order is: 
(i) issued or made by a prescribing practitioner who holds an unrestricted registration with the 
federal Drug Enforcement Administration, and an active Utah controlled substance license in 
good standing issued by the division under this section, or a medical resident who is exempted 
from licensure under Subsection 58-l-307(l)(c); 
(ii) authorized by the prescribing practitioner treating the patient and the prescribing practitioner 
designates the quantity ordered; 
(iii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by the prescriber affirming his 
authorization of the order within 48 hours after filling or administering the order, and the 
patient's record reflects the quantity actually administered; and 
(iv) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession within the physical structure of 
the hospital, or the order is taken from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the 
amount taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient authorized to receive it. 
(h) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe, administer, or dispense a 
controlled substance to a minor, without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis of the minor except in cases of an 
emergency. For purposes of this Subsection (7)(h), "minor" has the same meaning as defined in 
Section 78-3a-103, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the administration 
of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering. 
(i) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe or administer dosages of a 
controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user. 
(j) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, 
address, or other personal information for the purpose of securing the controlled substance. 
(k) A person who is licensed under this chapter to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance may not manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or any other authorized person not authorized by this license. 
(1) A person licensed under this chapter may not omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol 
required by this chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter. 
(m) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any 
record notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under this chapter. 
(n) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse entry into any premises for inspection as 
authorized by this chapter. 
(o) A person licensed under this chapter may not furnish false or fraudulent material information 
in any application, report, or other document required to be kept by this chapter or willfully make 
any false statement in any prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter. 
(8) (a) (i) Any person licensed under this chapter who is found by the department to have violated 
any of the provisions of Subsections (7)(k) through (7)(o) is subject to a penalty not to exceed 
$5,000. The department shall determine the procedure for adjudication of any violations in 
accordance with Sections 58-1-106 and 58-1-108. 
(ii) The division shall deposit all penalties collected under Subsection (8)(a)(i) in the General 
Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the division under Subsection 58-37-7.7(1). 
(b) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(h) through (7)(j) is: 
(i) upon first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) upon second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(k) through (7)(o) shall 
upon conviction be guilty of a third degree felony. 
(9) Any information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully 
procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled substance is not considered to be a 
privileged communication. 
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8 Prohibited acts -Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A -Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more 
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any 
other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second 
or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact 
finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which 
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B -Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or 
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, 
boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by 
persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, 
but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, 
and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of 
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a 
person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this 
Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances 
not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting 
to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing 
serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C -Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license 
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of 
obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to 
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to 
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to 
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of 
this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, 
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of 
another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to 
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D -Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter 
who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any 
of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at 
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution 
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a 
first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of 
the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction 
or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution 
in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or 
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or 
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the 
character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly 
under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-501 Presumption of innocence -"Element of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the 
offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303 Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs 
when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does 
not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is 
an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening 
the injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor denies commission of 
the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall 
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the 
offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good 
cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with 
prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be 
presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on 
entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is an issue, past 
offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant testifies 
he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at 
a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST, amend. V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
U.S. CONST, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UT CONST, art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
UT CONST, art. I, § 13 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof 
shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
UT CONST, art. I, § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
RULE 4. PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information 
sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in 
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. 
An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the 
offense. Such things as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments 
may be described by any name or description by which they are generally known or by which 
they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial 
notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict 
if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense 
with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set 
of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of 
the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the 
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at 
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court 
may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The 
request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual 
information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained therein 
may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the statute 
creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are 
otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based shall be 
endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement 
shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting 
attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he 
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before the 
magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall 
be the same as against a natural person. 
RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the 
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to 
make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor 
such information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence 
which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days 
before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by 
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at 
specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable 
limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to 
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, 
abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of 
videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be 
denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be 
modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may 
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex 
parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records 
of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court 
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the 
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials 
which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. 
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Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, 
reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his 
counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless 
relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-
trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along 
with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further 
sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other 
rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; 
EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the 
crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of 
character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case 
to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, 
and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
ADDENDUM B 
5. PROBABLE CAUSE and INFORMATION. 
On January 21, 2002, CI gave a statement to law 
enforcement outlining Dr. Penn's improper use of his DEA license 
ua prescribing narcotics. Wsaid when a prescription is filled 
utfxder a staff member's name, it is shared with Dr. Penn and| other 
&£*#£. er said narcotics are left out on Dr. Penn's shelf frr in 
his desk drawer or filing cabinet. Ot-isaid Dr. Penn has se|en 
patients while he was under the influence of narcotics and |to the 
extent that staff members had to remind him of why he saw the 
patients so he could dictate because he could not remember.J CI 
s#id pharmacies often call because prescriptions are wrong jor are 
written for the wrong amounts .or doses. CI said one patienjt had 
med boxes in the office and the medications were gone beforje they 
should have been, so to make up for the missing meds, Dr. Pjenn 
called in a new prescription with an increase in dosage. C|I said 
Djc. Penn sent out letters stating he would no longer prescribe 
oxycontin, but: yet he continued to prescribe oxycontin. CI] said 
$« patient brought in five Duragesic patches and four came vip 
fflpbssmg^ ®n January 30
 r 200P, CT Raid Cindy Drew told her [that 
tfcey were closing errly the next day because she and Dr. Pqnn 
wpre going to do Tnushroomt. The DEA was contacted with thi^ s 
information. 
Approximately two weeks a^o, CI was in the residence 
described above as 300 Bast itHTlSouth. Moab, Grand County, iUtah., 
ajnq_a&w some multi-dose vial£-.of. Demerol in th&xr ref ricrerjitor~ 
ClI also .saw-finnng. .rtvyrnnt-jfl in a pr^ flnript.ion bottle, labeled with 
t&e name .of ..-Robert Silver, - in rhf bathroom. ™~ "* ^ 
, On April 19, 2002, CI was wired by agents and Cljwent 
t;o the above described residence. CI asked Penn and Drew ibout 
tjhe side effects o-f using mushrooms. CI said CI • s brother jhad 
some mushrooms that CI was considering trying. Penn and D^ew 
gave CI their opinion of how safe mushrooms were and said j.t was 
good. They described how mushrooms would make CI feel which was 
based on their past experience of using mushrooms. Penn tpen 
gaid to CI If he stocked any extra,we'll buy i t . Drew then said 
tjhey got theirs from th2 northwest. Penn then said again, J If 
He's got any extr$, I'll buy some from him. Penn Chen sai<ji, 
enough for two of us. Drew then said, Well, I'll buy some] for 
Zj>ave too, cuz I owe Dav3 a favor and he wanted some. 
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AFF. DAVIT 
UCA 77-23-1 et seq. and UCA 58-37-10 
$TATE OP UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Grand ) 
The investigator undersigned, being duly sworn, States 
on oath the following: 
1. OFFICER. Your affiant is Diversion Investigator 
Rob Johnson of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Your affiant 
is an investigator specifically assigned to investigate thfc 
diversion of legally manufactured controlled 9UbStances inpo an 
Illegal market. Your affiant has been an investigator in this 
Specific field for e.bouu 13 years. Your affiant has been 
involved in numerous investigations. 
2. PROPERTY, I request a search warrant to searcn a 
jsingle residence dwelling located at 300 East 300 South, Mbab, 
Grand County, Utah, further described as a white sided with green 
fzrim house, grey shingles, two doors facing north, the doolr to 
the east is a gnaen screen door, the door to the west is ah 
aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on east side of home, the 
fiumbers 300 are by the east door, there is a driveway on the west 
jside with an aluminum hut over the driveway. Said residence is 
Within a drug free sone. 
Your affiant requests this search warrant to look for 
the following; controlled substances, including, but not limited 
to, psilocybin mushrooms and narcotics. 
3. LOCATION. I have probable cause to believe: the 
above described property may be located in the residence 
described above. 
4. GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe ithere 
Exists evidence of the crimes of Possession of a Controlled 
{Substance and/or Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Subtetance, 
and within a drug free zone. 
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a driveway on the' west side with an aluminum hut over the 
driveway. 
To search for the following: controlled substances, 
including/ but not limited to, psilocybin mushrooms and/or 
controlled substances. 
This search warrant is valid only upon the occurence of 
the events described in the affidavit for this anticipatory 
search warrant. 
If you"find any of the property described above, or any 
part thereof, bring it before me immediately at this court as 
"J^quifedTby UCA 77-23-207. 
You are authorized to execute this search warrant, AT 
&NY TIME DURING THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING 
ENTRY, of your authority and purpose. 
TIME: ^j S ^ P/yV PATE: ^l^i A ' 
Judge
 s j u 
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Criminal No, , 
SEARCH WARRANT 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF 
&RAND, STATE OF UTAH* 
Proof by rffidavit was made before me this day by 
investigator Rob Johnson that there is probable cause for 
Issuance of an anticipatory search warrant, as more fully set 
fcorth in the affidavit on file with the Court. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate se.larch, 
AT ANYTIME OF THE DAY OR NIGHT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANNOUNCING 
ENTRY, of: a single residence dwelling located at 3 00 Easti 3 00 
South, Moab, Grand County, Utah, further described as a 
£ white sided wo-th green trim house, grey shingles, two dolors 
facing north, the door to the east is a green screen door, the 
door to the west is an aluminum screen door, red brick chimney on 
£ast side of home, the numbers 300 are by the east door, there is 
1 
y)>#r 
Dr. Nathaniel Penn and Cindy Drew live together in the 
ibove described residence and said residence is within a drug 
tree zone. 
6. ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION. On April 20, 2002, 
between 1000 and noon, DEA agents will meet with CI. CI aiid an 
undercover agent ?UC) will be searched and CI will be wire£. CI 
<j>r UC will be given som^ psilocybin mushrooms. CI's vehicle will 
also be searched. CI and an undercover agent will drive ih CI's 
tehicle to the above described residence of Penn and Drew yith 
tihe mushrooms. Agents will have CI and UC under visual anA audio 
Observation at all times driving to and from said residency, 
^hey will have CI and uc under audio observation while they are 
\.n the residence. It is anticipated that CI and UC will offer 
t>enn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash an£/or 
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave; the 
iresidence, CI and UC and CI's vehicle will be re-searched. 
Your affiant is requesting this warrant be a no-knock 
Warrant, to be served at any time of the night or day, for, the 
Reason y o W affiant firmly believes it is 6afer for police; 
Officers, participants and non-participants to the operation if 
the officers have the safety of an unannounced entry. Further, 
there is an extremely high risk of the potential disposal and/or 
Concealment of drugs by the occupants prior to an announced entry 
by the police, 
DATE: t-i/ri/n 
T 
TIME: Ll ^ V / y / 
1 / 
SIGNED :^foft \f /(' /M^M^ 
Investigator Rob Johhson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ' \' day bf 
April, 2002. 








THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
NATHANIEL F. PENN, 
Defendant, 
RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No.0217-243 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant, Nathaniel Penn ("Penn"), has moved the court for 
a new trial. The State objected. The Court addresses each 
argument in turn 
VALIDITY OF WARRANT 
Penn complains that the search warrant that led to the 
discovery of illegal drugs in his home was invalid. Penn 
challenged the validity of the warrant before his trial and that 
challenge was denied. Penn renews some of the same arguments 
raised before trial and some new arguments as well. 
The Court sees no reason to change its analysis of the 
arguments raised earlier. As to the arguments raised now for the 
first time, those arguments are rejected because: 
STATE OF UTAH RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
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1. Even though the affidavit failed to recite that the 
officers expected Penn to accept the offer of drugs, 
the affidavit does give good reason to believe that he 
would accept the offer. The magistrate clearly-
intended that acceptance of the offer would be the 
trigger for execution of the warrant, and the conduct 
of the officers shows that they understood this as 
well. 
2. Even though the affiant said that the confidential 
informant and her car would be searched, the warrant 
did not clearly specify that the search must occur 
before the warrant would be valid. Had that question 
been specifically addressed, this Court is confident 
that the magistrate would not have conditioned the 
warrant's validity on the search having previously 
occurred, especially given that a DEA agent was to 
personally participate in the transaction. 
3. With regards to the psilocybin possession charge, the 
evidence against Penn was overwhelming, even without 
the mushrooms themselves. 
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PENN'S STATEMENT 
Penn has not persuaded the Court that the failure of his 
previous counsel to seek to suppress his pre-Miranda statements 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. It is not obvious 
that Penn was in custody at the time he was asked about the 
location of the drugs. In addition, the Court does not believe 
that Penn suffered any prejudice at trial from admission of his 
pre-Miranda statements. 
THE DEAL BETWEEN THE STATE AND GENE AND LISA LAPLANTE 
Penn has presented evidence from depositions in a civil case 
that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss aggravated assault charges 
against Gene LaPlante in exchange for Lisa LaPlante's cooperation 
with law enforcement. Penn has presented no evidence that other 
charges against Gene LaPlant were part of the deal. Penn!s trial 
counsel elicited testimony at trial that Gene LaPlante was 
permitted to plead guilty to Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, a lesser offense of Aggravated Assault, a 
Third Degree Felony, and that his plea was held in abeyance, with 
eventual dismissal if Gene LaPlante complied with certain 
conditions unrelated to this case. The Court's records in that 
case, of which the Court takes notice, support this testimony. 
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It is evident from the record that Penn's trial counsel knew 
of the disposition of the charges against Gene LaPlante. It is 
also evident that he chose to use evidence of Gene LaPlante's 
charge and conviction in two ways. First, counsel attempted to 
portray Lisa LaPlante as a person affected by her unreasonable 
anger towards Penn. His theory was that Lisa was angry at Penn 
for calling the police when Gene threatened her with a gun. 
Second, though not strictly relevant to the issues in the case, 
counsel attempted to portray Lisa LaPlante as an ungrateful 
recipient of Penn's generosity. Counsel never asked LaPlante 
whether she had received any promises in exchange for her 
testimony. Indeed, since Gene LaPlante's case had been disposed 
of already, there would have been little reason for the jury to 
give such evidence significant weight. Penn's trial counsel 
correctly chose the more productive approach of using evidence of 
Gene LaPlante's charges to portray Lisa LaPlante as vindictive 
and ungrateful. This strategy was not objectively unreasonable. 
THE THREE WITNESSES 
Penn complained that witness statement of Angie Stoughton, 
Marie Packard, and Robert Silver were not disclosed and contained 
"favorable" statements about Penn. The Court has reviewed those 
STATE OF UTAH RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs 
NATHANIEL PENN Page 5 
written statements, and finds nothing there that would have 
helped Penn that was not presented to the jury. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
This case presented an interesting question; a doctor 
possessing and dispensing prescription drugs without following 
the procedures outlined in statutes governing prescriptions of 
drugs. The evidence was undisputed that Penn did not fill out 
the forms required by law to acquire narcotics for dispensing in 
his clinic. Instead, he wrote prescriptions for office 
employees, even though the employee did not need the narcotic, 
and then had the employee bring the drug back to the office. 
Undisputed evidence also was introduced that some patients of 
Penn brought unused portions of narcotic prescriptions back to 
Penn and that Penn dispensed those narcotics. Whether Penn 
required that any record of such dispensing be kept was disputed. 
The Court sought input from Pean's trial counsel concerning 
how to instruct the jury about the charges of illegal possession 
of prescription drugs. While Penn now claims that failing to 
keep records of dispensing is at most a misdemeanor, that was not 
his position at trial. He may well have elected to accede to the 
language proposed by the Court in order to avoid different, less 
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favorable language. For example, the jury might have been 
instructed that any doctor who acquires narcotics for office use 
by writing a prescription for an employee without medical need is 
possessing the narcotic illegally. 
Utah's appellate courts have given no guidance on how to 
instruct a jury in a case like this. In the absence of clear 
authority, the decision of Penn's counsel to accept language that 
was arguably more favorable than other alternatives is not 
objectively unreasonable. Penn cannot now be permitted to second 
guess that decision and obtain a new trial with a different 
instruction, followed if necessary by a third trial with yet a 
third version of the instructions. 
The motion for new trial is denied. 
2SlU Dated this ^C/J^ day of July, 2003. 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT CQUR' 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OFl UTAH 
FILED 
NOV 1 I 2002 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




TO THE JURY 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
The defendant, NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, is accused by 
an Information filed in this Court by the County Attorney of 
Grand County, State of Utah, of having committed the following 
crimes: 
COUNT 1: 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE, in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
2002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., psilocin, in 
a drug free zone. 
COUNT 2: 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE, in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
2 002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled Substance, i.e., hydrocodone, 
SENT BY: MOAB FAMILY PRACTIC; 4352594770; DEC-10-02 4:54PM; 
without a valid prescription or order, in a drug free zone. 
COUNT 3: 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OP A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE, in violation of Section 58-3/-8, Utah Code Annotated, 19 
as amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
2002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
intentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., demerol, 
without a valid prescription or order, in a drug free zone. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /— 
It is my duty to instruct you about the law applicable to this 
case and your duty to follow that law in deciding what happened and 
whether the defendant is guilty. You must base your decision on 
the evidence introduced at this trial. 
Do not allow sympathy for the defendant or respect for the 
prosecutor to influence your decision. The charge itself is no 
evidence of guilt. You should not be affected by emotion, 
prejudice or speculation. Do not worry about the result of your 
"verSic^ T" 
You must conscientiously and/dispassionately consider the 
evidence and apply the law. Your verdict must express each juror's 
opinion. 
SENT BY: MOAB FAMILY PAACTIC; 4352594770; DEC-10-02 4:55PM; PAGE 4 
INSTRUCTION NO . 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offenae beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF PSILOCttlN IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant possessed psilocin, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Knowing what it was and intending to possess it. 
COUNT II: ILLEGAL POSSESSION 0F HYDROCODONE IN A DRUG FREE 
ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
COUNT III: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEMEROL IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2 Defendant knowingly' and intentionally possessed 
demerol, 
3, In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
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If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO * / 
Drug Free Zone means at or within 1,000 feet of any 
public or private elementary or secondary school or the grounds 
of any of those schools. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 3 
Hydrocodone and meperidine (or demerol) are controlled 
substances that may be legally prescribed and legally possessed 
Psilocm orpallucinogenic mushrooms may never be legally 
prescribed and cannot be legally possessed except for law 
enforcement purposes, 
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INSTRUCTION NO. IQ 
Physicians licensed to prescribe controlled substances must 
still obtain a prescription for any controlled substances for 
personal use. Physician*L licensed to dispense or administer 
controlled substances are also permitted to possess reasonable 
quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or 
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record 
of controlled substances received for that purpose and dispensed 
or administered by them as physicians. A physician who fails to 
comply with this requirement possesses those substances 
illegally* 
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INSTRUCTION NO, J_ 
Defendant has not been charged with illegally prescribing 
controlled substances. You are therefore not expected to 
determine whether defendant illegally prescribed oxycontin or any 
other drugs to patients. Evidence About reports of such activity 
was permitted only as an explanation for the DEA investigation. 
You should not concern yourself with whether the defendant did or 
did not engage m such activity. This case is about whether 
defendant possessed psilocin, hydrocodone and/or demerol, on 
April 20, 2002 at the Criflthia Drew residence. It is not about 
whether he did something wrong on some other occasion. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. , Q 
Defendant has raised the affirmative defense of entrapment. 
The law permits the police to engage in undercover activities in 
order to determine whether individuals are engaging in criminal 
activity. The police or their agents are not expected or 
required to inform the subjects of those investigations that they 
are police agents- That would obviously defeat the purpose of 
the undercover investigation. 
However, the law does place limits on police conduct in 
undercover investigations. The police are not permitted to use 
methods that create a substantial risk that a crime would be 
committed by someone not otherwise ready to commit it. Use of 
such methods constitutes entrapment>and is prohibited by law. 
However, conduct which merely affords a person an opportunity to 
commit a crime is not entrapment. 
Once the defendant raises the defense, the state has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that police methods 
did not create a substantial risk that someone not otherwise so 
disposed would commit a crime, but faerely provided defendant an 
opportunity to commit a crime. If the state fails to establish 
this, defendant should be found not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / 
In order to find that the-defendant possessed a 
controlled substance, you must finds 1) actual physical 
possession which is knowing and intentional, or 2) constructive 
possession. 
A person has constructivespossession of a controlled 
substance when that substance is subject to his dominion and 
control. 
Constructive possession occurs when there is a 
sufficient nexus (relationship) between the accused and the 
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had 
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the controlled substance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ID 
Although a person may not have exclusive control or 
possession of a controlled substance, his non-exclusive 
possession and control combined with other incriminating evidence 
may support a conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
The control need not be exclusive but may extend to 
situations where the contraband is dmmediately and exclusively 
accessible and is subject to his dominion or control, or to the 
joint dominion and control of the accused and another. 
Other incriminating evidence may include, but is not 
limited to, (1) the defendant's presence at the time the 
contraband is found, with emphasis,on the fact that the 
contraband was in plain or open view: (2) the defendant's access 
to the contraband, (3) the proximity of the defendant to the 
contraband, (4) evidence indicating that the defendant was 
participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the 
contraband, and/or (5) incriminating statements. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. / * 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in 
view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on 
fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough, proof to satisfy the mind, or 
convince the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, 
and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION*NO. |~*^ 
You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts of the case- When 
weighing testimony you should consider the witness's appearance and 
demeanor, apparent honesty and candor, opportunity to observe, 
ability to understand and capacity to remember. You may consider 
the interest which a witness has in the result of the trial and any 
bias or motive the witness may have to testify for or against 
either side. 
If you believe any witness has intentionally not told you the 
truth about any important fact, you-may disregard everything that 
witness said except as other credible evidence may prove the 
testimony to be true. You do not have to believe everything, or 
even anything, a witness has said. You can believe one witness 
against many or many against one. 
uum DI. muMD I-AMILY HHACTIC; 4352594770; DEC-10-02 4:57PM; PAGE 15 
JURY INSTRUCTION' NO, ( D 
The defendant can testify on his own behalf. You must weigh 
his testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of others• You 
may consider the interest of the defendant in the result of the 
trial, but should not disregard the defendant's testimony simply 
because the criminal charges have been filed. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /^| 
The evidence you should consider includes the testimony or 
words of witnesses who have testified, exhibits received in 
evidence, and any facts stipulated by the lawyers. You may draw 
reasonable inferences from the evidence and those inferences are 
evidence. Statements of the lawyers are not evidence. 
If the evidence is in dispute, you should reconcile the 
differences as best you can, but ultimately you are the final 
judges of the evidence and you must resolve those conflicts and 
decide from the evidence what you believe the truth to be. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. / £> 
Your attitudes and conduct when you begin to deliberate are 
important. It is not usually helpful to emphatically state, upon 
entering the jury room, an intention to stand for a certain 
verdict. If you do that, your pridfe may be aroused, and you may 
hesitate to abandon that position even if later convinced that you 
were wrong. You are not advocates or partisans; you are judges. 
The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the 
verdict you unitedly return, not the opinions you individually hold 
as deliberations begin. You will m&ke a definite contribution to 
justice if you arrive at a fair verdict. There can be no triumph 
for a juror except the declaration of the truth. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ILQ 
You should consult together with a view to reaching a verdict, 
as long as you can do so without violence to your individual 
belief. Each of you should decide this case for yourself, but only 
after consulting with the other jurors. Often something you 
overlooked changes your perspective. Do not hesitate to change an 
opinion if it is wrong, but do not surrender your honest 
convictions just to reach a verdict or just because others disagree 
with you. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ' ' 
I will decide what punishment the defendant receives if he is 
convicted. This is not your decision. Do not worry about what the 
punishment may be when you decide whether the defendant is guilty. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /j) 
If I have said anything which suggests that I favor one side 
or another in this case, please disregard it. I am not permitted, 
and I have not intended, to indicate any such preference. It is 
your responsibility to decide which side is correct, not mine. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO, | 7 
Your first responsibility when you retire to deliberate is to 
select a foreperson. Your verdict mudt be unanimous. When you have 
decided on a verdict with respect td each charge, your foreperson 
should sign it, and then contact the bailiff, who will bring you 
back into court as soon as all the oarties can be gathered 
together. 
These [ ( instructions are signed and dated this day of 
